Res Ipsa Loquiter in Exploding Bottle Cases by Bennington, Ronald K.
RES IPSA LOQUITER IN EXPLODING BOTTLE CASES
Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Company of Charleston
109 S.E.2d 489 (W.Va. 1959)
Plaintiff, while shopping in a super-market, suffered injuries as a
result of the explosion of a pop bottle manufactured and bottled by the
defendant. The carton containing the defective bottle had been delivered
to the market and placed on the shelf by the defendant's employee earlier
the same day. Whereas the evidence indicated that the plaintiff did not
touch the bottle, nothing was offered to show that the bottle had not been
mishandled by persons other than the defendant's employee. Even though
actual control of the bottle had passed from the defendant, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia rendered judgment for the plaintiff
basing their decision on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
One of the traditional requirements for the application of res ipsa
loquitur is that the agent or instrument causing the injury be within the
control or management of the defendant.1 When this requirement is pres-
ent in an accident of a type which usually does not occur in the absence
of someone's negligence, a presumption or inference2 is raised that it is
more probable than not that the defendant's negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident.
Historically, application of res ipsa loquitur to exploding bottle situa-
tions was limited by the control requirement. Under the classical interpre-
tation, control must be physical and exclusive; adherence to this view is
manifested by courts refusing to apply the doctrine to unexplained burst-
ing bottle cases where actual control had passed from the defendant.'
This reluctance stems from the notion that in these situations there is an
enhanced possibility that the accident was a result of an intervening cause.
Because of the difficulty of proving the bottler's specific acts of negli-
gence, the majority of courts apparently have adopted the view that con-
1 PROSSER, TORTS § 42, at 205 (2d ed. 1955); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2509
(3d ed. 1940).
2The majority of jurisdictions regard res ipsa loquitur as creating an in-
ference of negligence which allows the plaintiff to get to the jury, but still permits
a finding for the defendant even though the defendant introduces no evidence
at all. Other courts attach a greater procedural importance to res ipsa by holding
it creates a presumption of negligence of which the jury must take cognizance.
Thus if the defendant fails to introduce evidence of due care, a directed verdict
for the plaintiff is proper. See, PROSSER, TORTS § 43, at 211 (2d ed. 1955) ; 65 C.J.S.
Negligence § 220 (3), at 996-7 (1950).
3 Dail v. Taylor, 151 N.C. 284, 66 S.E. 135 (1909); Annot., 4 A.L.R. 1094
(1921). See Stewart v. Crystal Coca Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P.2d 952
(1937) ; Slack v. Premier-Pabst Corporation, 40 Del. 97, 5 A.2d 516 (1939) ;
Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 311 Mass. 514, 42 N.E.2d 259 (1942); Wheeler
v. Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743 (1916) (bursting bottle said to
be unforseen accident for which there is no liability) ; Seven-Up Bottling Co., Inc.
v. Gretes, 182 Va. 138, 27 S.E.2d 925 (1943).
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trol at the time of the negligent act satisfies the requirement.4 The pur-
pose of the actual control requirement is preserved by requiring an af-
firmative showing by the plaintiff that due care has been used by all per-
sons handling the bottle since leaving the defendant's possession.5 It is
not necessary, however, for the plaintiff to eliminate every remote inter-
vening possibility; only enough evidence is required to permit a finding
that the accident was probably due to the defendant's original negligence.
6
After a few early decisions that res ipsa was not applicable to ex-
ploding bottle cases,7 Ohio now seems to be well in accord with the ma-
jority view.' Although adopting the more lenient concept of control,
Ohio courts still require the plaintiff's showing of evidence excluding any
probable cause of the accident except defendant's negligence.
The Ferrell decision may well have extremely important effects not
only in West Virginia9 but also in other jurisdictions. The court states
that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may apply even though physical con-
trol has passed from the defendant "where plaintiff establishes . . . that
no person was probably negligent in the handling of the bottle subsequent
4 Some courts expressly state that control at the time of the neglient act
satisfies the requirement, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d
453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944); Hoffing v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d
3 (Dist. Ct. App. 1948). Other courts reach the same result by requiring an af-
firmative showing by the plaintiff that all persons handling the bottle since leav-
ing the defendant's possession have used due care, Payne v. Rome Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E. 1087 (1912); Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 474
(1949). See Florence Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 259 Ala. 56, 65 So.2d 169
(1953); Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Smith v. Hicks, 215 Ark. 803, 223 S.W.2d
762 (1949) ; Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 39 Cal.2d 436, 47 P.2d 344
(1952) ; Hughs v. Miami Coca Cola Bottling Co., 155 Fla. 299, 19 So.2d 862 (1944)
(no recovery since no affirmative showing by plaintiff); Bradley v. Conway
Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan. 282, 118 P.2d 601 (1941); Evangelio v. Metro-
politan Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342 (Mass. 1959); Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 143 Tex. 272, 183 S.W.2d 968 (1944) (error to refuse offer of evidence by
plaintiff that he had used due care).
5 See generally, supra note 3.
6 See Ruffin v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., supra note 3; Zentz v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co. of Fresno, s.upra note 4.
7 Birn v. Coca Cola Bottling Corp., 13 Ohio L. Abs. 727 (C.P. 1933). See
Burger v. Renner Products Co., 2 Ohio L. Abs. 189 (Ct. App. 1924) (cork blowing
out of bottle containing soft drink).
8Leach v. Joyce Products Co., 66 Ohio L. Abs. 296, 116 N.E.2d 834 (Ct. App.
1952); Fick v. Pilsener Brewing Co., 54 Ohio L. Abs. 97, 86 N.E.2d 616 (C.P.
1949); Tennebaum v. Pendergast, 55 Ohio L. Abs. 231, 89 N.E.2d 490 (C.P.
1948).
9 This is the first exploding bottle case in West Virginia in which res ipsa
loquitur is used to allow recovery. In Cunningham v. Parkersburg Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 137 W.Va. 827, 74 S.E.2d 409 (1953), where the bottom of a carton
of pop gave way injuring plaintiff, the doctrine was held inapplicable. In Keefer
v. Logan Coca Cola Bottling Works, 141 W.Va. 839, 93 S.E.2d 225 (1956), the
doctrine was not applied because the evidence warranted an interpretation that
someone other than the defendant may have mishandled the bottle. In Ferrell, the
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to the delivery." 1 The evidence in fact required, however, seems to have
been somewhat less than this, for the, doctrine was employed even though
there was "no proof, indeed no attempt to prove, that the bottle or the
carton was probably handled or mishandled by any such person."'" By not
requiring Ferrell to make an affirmative showing that due care was used
by all persons in handling the bottle since leaving Royal Crown, the court
apparently reasons that form the mere fact of the shortness of the elapsed
time between the defendant's release of control and the injury to the
plaintiff, it may be presumed that there was no mishandling of the bottle
or its contents by some independent agent. The burden then shifts to the
defendant to show that other persons have mishandled the bottle since
leaving the defendant's possession.
One of the reasons for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is the desire
to relieve the plaintiff of the difficult burden of proving specific acts of
negligence when this information is more accessible to the adverse party.
As applied to the instant case, the defendant certainly is more likely to
know what occurred during the processes of bottling, inspection and de-
livery than is the plaintiff. However, both parties are equally unaware of
what may have happened after the bottle left the defendant's possession.
Therefore, the extension of the doctrine to always eliminate the plaintiff's
affirmative burden of showing due care in the handling of the bottle by
others after leaving the bottler's possession appears unwarranted. Of
course, the burden of proof should be shifted to the defendant if the cir-
cumstances are such that after taking account of the defendant's possible
negligence before delivery and the possible negligence of others subsequent
to delivery, it is still more probable than not that the defendant's original
negligence caused the accident. The finding of such a probability may be
justified in Ferrell since the bottle exploded the same day that it was de-
livered. Still this does not necessarily vindicate recognizing such a prob-
ability as part of the res ipsa loquiter in general. In effect such an exten-
sion makes the bottler an insurer against such accidents. 2
court substantiates its use of the doctrine on the basis of its application in former
holdings where a contaminated article was found in the bottle, Parr v. Coca Cola
Bottling Works of Charleston, 121 W.Va. 314, 3 S.E.2d 499 (1939); Blevins v.
Raleigh Coca Cola Bottling Works, 121 W.Va. 427, 3 S.E.2d 627 (1939).
10 Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Company of Charleston, 109 S.E.2d 489,
490 (W.Va. 1959) (syllabus by the court).
11 Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Charleston, supra note 10 at 491
(emphasis added).
12 See Judge Haymond's dissenting opinion in Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bot-
tling Co. of Charleston, supra note 10, 493.
To place such a burden on bottlers seems unjust in spite of the fact that they may
obtain liability insurance and spread the cost of same to their customers through
higher prices. At any rate, if we are to hold bottlers as insurers, it seems it
would be better to do so under an absolute liability theory rather than by a




The Ferrell court probably felt the character of the evidence elim-
inated the need of Ferrell's affirmative showing."3 However, the failure
of the court to fully explain this position (assuming it was the basis of
their decision) may have important repercussions, for a court could reason-
ably interpret the Ferrell decision as eliminating the plaintiff's affirmative
burden in all situations. In any event, the acceptance of this extension will
be determined by two factors: the notion in some jurisdictions that res
ipsa must be freely applied because of plaintiff's difficulty of proving the
defendant's specific acts of negligence,' 4 and the view in others that the
doctrine has already too much usurped the traditional burden of proof in
negligent actions.
Ronald K. Bennington
13 Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Charleston, supra note 10, at 493.
Cf. Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., supra note 4 where bottle had only
been out of control of defendant for a short time, recovery was allowed only
after the plaintiff showed due care.
14Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d. 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944) (res ipsa appli-
cable for injuries received by plaintiff during surgery even though plaintiff could
not designate actual defendant or insrtument which caused the injury) ; Furr v.
McGrath, 340 P.2d 243 (Okl. 1959) (while working on plaintiff's car, jack slipped
out from under the auto injuring the plaintiff-res ipsa held applicable since it
was virtually impossible for plaintiff to show what actually had happened).
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